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Introduction
The increase in agricultural trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico has been
accompanied by tension and conflict over trade in several commodities. This tension is caused by a
myriad of factors that spring from the perceptions and concerns of producers. Some of these concerns
can be explained in economic terms and others cannot. Without ranking or judging these concerns the list
includes: (1) the desire of domestic producers to protect national domestic markets from imports,
particularly when trade flows are largely in one direction; (2) differences in policies between countries
that sometimes result in a lack of reciprocal access; (3) fears, well founded or not, that imports may carry
a pest or disease that would spread and be harmful to the domestic industry; (4) anxiety that imports are
due to government subsidization in the exporting country; (5) worry that agriculture is losing its
uniqueness in the policy process and will no longer receive government subsidization; (6) tension caused
by the rapid pace of globalization and the increasing importance of the WTO; and finally (7) fears that
U.S. agriculture is not competitive in world food markets. For some agricultural industries, overlaying
the tension caused by imports are generally poor economic conditions within the industry.
This paper discusses the effectiveness of current mechanisms to avoid and resolve agricultural
trade disputes between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, members of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It begins with a brief discussion of elements of dispute resolution (CDR
1999; Moore 1996; Deutsch 1973). It then examines current efforts and mechanisms to avoid and resolve
disputes and presents an initial and preliminary evaluation of the extent to which these efforts meet
certain desirable characteristics of dispute resolution. 
Elements of Conflict Resolution
The literature on conflict resolution presents ideas about different strategies for negotiations over
an issue. Positional and interest based bargaining are the basis for contrasting models of dispute
resolution and are useful for our purposes, as they provide a baseline with which to evaluate available
dispute resolution strategies within NAFTA. In positional bargaining, negotiators begin by selecting and
ranking positions to be presented in the negotiation (CDR 1999; Fisher and Ury 1991). Positions areConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 2  
alternate solutions to an issue that meet the particular interests or needs of one party. Both negotiators
present their initial position (with their maximum anticipated gain) and then, through a series of
incremental concessions, arrive at a compromise (Figure 1). When positional bargaining is used, the
parties usually do not regard their interests (underlying needs and concerns) as interdependent. Usually
positional negotiators give current and future relationships relatively low priority. In positional
bargaining resources are generally regarded as fixed, leading to the conclusion that if one party gets
more, another gets less. Highly adversarial relationships often result. A benefit of positional bargaining is
that trust and the full disclosure of information between parties is not required. Another benefit is that
positional bargaining may be useful in division of fixed-sum resources (CDR 1999). A disadvantage of
positional bargaining is that the rapid presentation of positions may cut off exploration of the underlying
needs of the parties and may shortchange investigation of more innovative ways to meet those needs. The
adversarial and fixed-sum nature of the negotiation may also damage the parties relationship.
Interest based bargaining approaches to conflict resolution focus on satisfying as many of the
needs or interests of the disputants as possible. This is achieved by exploring the interests of the parties
Figure 1.  Positional Bargaining
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and evaluating multiple solutions in an attempt to satisfy the greatest possible number of needs. When
possible, resources as not regarded as fixed and negotiators use cooperative problem-solving efforts to
investigate solutions. Interest based negotiation requires trust and may uncover divergent values and
interests. Due to the process used, interest based negotiations may require more time than positional
bargaining. Advantages include solutions that meet specific needs, unanticipated beneficial outcomes,
and strengthening of ongoing relationships.
Successful resolution of disputes requires a framework that addresses the substantive,
psychological, and procedural aspects of disputes (Figure 2). Lasting solutions to disputes may be
hindered by inadequate fulfillment of any of the three aspects. Substantive aspects include the objective
needs at hand. For the purpose of this discussion, substantive issues include access to markets, trade
rules, import levels, and economic conditions within an industry. Psychological aspects include the need
for disputants to be included in the resolution process and for the process to be perceived as fair. Another
psychological need is to address issues of bias and stereotypes, which is critical for the creation of long
Figure 2.  The Triangle of Satisfaction
Source: CDR 1999.Conflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 4  
1The term cooperative is appropriate here due to a long history of use in the dispute resolution and game theory literatures.
However, while the interests are cooperative, or alternatively, common to both parties, the parties may not be cooperating in
their actions. 
lasting relationships. Finally, procedural aspects address the mechanics of how the dispute is resolved.
Questions about mechanics include whether or not the dispute resolution structure is appropriate for the
dispute and if parties agree on the process. For the issues considered in this paper, it is also important
that the settlement options produced are congruent with existing obligations held by the parties. For
example, industry representatives may agree on a regulatory change without being empowered to
implement the change.
Dispute Avoidance
Anticipation and early resolution of conflict may bring many of the benefits of settlement
without the costs associated with a full blown conflict. The U.S-Canadian beef industry dispute initiated
by the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R-CALF ) (Loyns, Young, and Carter 2000; Young
2000) are hypothesized by this author to be partially caused by an inaccurate assessment by U.S. beef
producers of their own interests. While this dispute has already occurred, perhaps the underlying
argument can usefully be applied to avoid disputes in other industries or further disputes in the cattle
industry. Regulatory harmonization is also discussed as a mechanism useful in dispute avoidance.
Identification of Interests
Progress on substantive issues must begin with the accurate identification of issues. Three
categories of interests for NAFTA’s agricultural industries are proposed. Competitive interests can be
summarized as when one party swims the other party sinks. Cooperative
1 interests exist when goals are
linked so that everyone sinks or swims together (Deutsch 1973). Some cooperative interests may be
pursued jointly, while others must be pursued separately due to institutional factors. The interests of the
Canadian and U.S. beef industries are used as an example (Table 1) (Young 2000).
U.S. and Canadian beef producers have a number of cooperative interests that they can jointly
address. The most important may be increasing consumer demand for beef by improving its quality,
healthfulness, reputation for safety, and price vis a vis substitutes. This is a cooperative interest, not a
competitive one, as given the integrated nature of the market, an increase in the demand for beef within
the United States or Canada will be beneficial to producers of both countries. One caveat must be Conflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 5  
Table 1.  Sample Interests of U.S. and Canadian Beef Industries
Type Criteria Examples
Cooperative Industries have a joint interest in
outcome, joint pursuit appropriate.
Increased domestic and export beef
demand.
Cooperative
  but separate
Both industries have an interest in the
outcome, but separate pursuit of
outcome appropriate.
Federal government regulations for
meat inspection—influence reputation
for safety.
Competitive Industries pursue competitive
outcomes separately.
Beef demand linked to attributes
including location, i.e., made in
Montana.
considered, that this applies for beef that is not differentiated by quality attributes linked to location,
which at most constitutes a very small portion of the market.
Producers from the two countries also have an interest in a reduction of transactions costs for
movement of cattle and beef across the border. To the extent that transactions costs can be reduced,
efficiency is achieved in the movement of cattle to processing plants and of boxed beef to market,
lowering basis costs and optimizing efficient utilization of plant capacity. Producers in some locations
may also gain from access to a packing plant across the border, whose entry into their market increases
competition for slaughter cattle.
The cooperative nature of U.S. and Canadian beef interests also holds true of U.S. and Canadian
beef export markets. The U.S. and Canadian industries depend on increases in export demand for market
growth and share a cooperative interest in reducing trade restrictions through multilateral trade
negotiations. It is true that U.S. beef prices would increase if imports were reduced or eliminated while
exports continued unfettered. However, this is not the environment that U.S. beef producers operate in
and is unlikely to occur in the future.
The U.S. and Canadian beef industries also have cooperative interests that must be independently
pursued by each industry. For example, meat inspection and food safety regulations influence beef
demand, a cooperative interest of the industries. However, as these policies are determined by national
governments, they are influenced by the national industry. Finally, the U.S. and Canadian industries alsoConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 6  
have competitive interests. In this category would fall competition for markets where demand is
influenced by quality attributes linked to location. 
An obstacle to recognition of the interdependence of the U.S. and Canadian beef industries is the
deeply rooted historical concept of a market as synonymous with the nationstate. This concept developed
due to trade barriers that at one time isolated the U.S. market, as well as the markets of other nations.
Some trade barriers were imposed by the government, including taxes, tariffs, quotas, and foreign
exchange controls. Natural trade barriers included the cost and adequacy of transportation and
communication to assess demand in foreign markets and to make transactions. In addition, reflecting
national preferences, federal government regulations and policies influenced the market environment and
made it distinct from other national market environments. The nationstate is the basis of international
trade law and trade agreements. For the U.S. beef industry, these factors were reinforced by a large
domestic market and little historical dependence on the export market. Many of these factors have
changed, due to changes in policies and technology, coincident with an increase in globalization.
Industries may benefit from consideration of when the market is synonymous with the nationstate and
when it is not. 
The existence of cooperative interests for many industries within the three NAFTA countries
necessitates rethinking current ways of organizing producer groups. One possibility is to form producer
groups that correspond with the cooperative interests of the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican industries.
National commodity groups would continue to pursue separate cooperative and competitive interests. 
The transition from national commodity groups to the creation of strong and viable trinational
commodity groups is difficult for several reasons. The existence of a group depends on the perceptions
held by members that they are a distinct entity due to their commonalities, an awareness and active
pursuit of cooperative interests, and a history of interactions between group members. Commodity
groups have existed for a long period of time on the basis of the national market. The movement to a
trinational market came quickly and without a corresponding shift in the identity of commodity groups.
Another factor impeding the development of trinational commodity groups is the ambiguous
commitment of national governments to free trade. While a commitment was made by memberConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 7  
governments to free trade, many mechanisms exist to buffer it, leading to confusion over the size of the
market, and the role of government. 
Regulatory Harmonization
The avoidance of disputes in agricultural trade is also achieved through the regulatory
harmonization. The harmonization of regulations in itself removes a substantive reason for disputes.
Equally important, the process of harmonization involves representatives of government and industry
from all three countries, and by doing so creates ongoing relationships that are critical in avoiding
disputes. Some of efforts to harmonize regulations occur through NAFTA, which provided ongoing
processes to harmonize regulations and policies of all three member countries. NAFTA mandated
committees to increase the compatibility of a wide range of policies (NAFTA 1993). 
The Committee on Standard Related Measures and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee
are composed of designees from the appropriate agency of member governments (Lennox 1999; Garvey
1999). Committee power is limited to making recommendations to member governments. Operation of
committees on the basis of consensus is key in ensuring the recommendations are taken back to the home
country agency and adopted.
The purpose of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Committee is to pursue equivalence of the
three countries SPS measures. Under the umbrella of the SPS Committee, the NAFTA Technical
Working Group on Pesticides is working to develop a coordinated pesticide regulatory framework among
NAFTA partners, to address trade irritants, to build national regulatory/scientific capacity, to initiate
joint review of applications, and to coordinate scientific and regulatory decisions on pesticides
(Environmental Protection Agency 1999). The Working Group on Pesticides has initiated procedural
changes to facilitate joint reviews of pesticide applications and has developed a protocol to prioritize its
work on regulatory differences causing trade disputes.
Regulatory changes have also been industry led. The Restricted Feeder Cattle Project, formerly
known as the North West Pilot Project, is an example (Young and Marsh 1998). The project resulted in
the reduction of sanitary requirements for feeder cattle exports from the United States into Canada,
reducing the cost of trade. The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association worked with the National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association, the Montana Stockgrowers Association, and with state and federal agencies from eachConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 8  
2 For further information see the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation homepage (http://www.fvdrc.com).
country, including the U.S. Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency, to change sanitary regulations for feeder cattle moved into Canada. In addition to Montana and
Washington, the pilot project now includes Idaho, North Dakota, Hawaii, and Alaska. This project
facilitated the export of 105,374 feeder cattle from the United States to Canada between October 1, 1999
and December 17, 1999. While increased market integration of the northwestern states and provinces in
the feeder cattle market did not prevent the R-CALF suits, recognition of the benefits of improved
commercial relations with Alberta did moderate producer support of R-CALF within the state of
Montana.
An example of an industry led effort involving all three NAFTA countries is provided by the
development of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation (FVDRC). Article 707 of
NAFTA mandated the creation of a subcommittee to address private commercial disputes for NAFTA
partners, with reference to the perishable produce industry. The subcommittee is composed of
representatives of industry and government from all three nations and began its work in 1996 (Chancey
2000). The subcommittee decided to address discrepancies in the systems of the three countries for
dealing with disputes arising from private commercial transactions in fruits and vegetables, including
issues of nonpayment and grading. The committee used a consultative process to develop a trinational
corporation to provide standards and dispute resolution services to the industries of the three countries
(Ash and Chancy 1999). Ash and Chancy summarize the lessons learned in the development of the
trinational corporation: (1) that a strong vision of mutual goals and interests is required; and (2) that
national identities need to be de-emphasized with a greater focus given to universally acceptable values
and objectives.
2
Evaluation of Current Dispute Avoidance Processes
The examples given above, including the NAFTA subcommittees, the FVDRC and the Restricted
Feeder Cattle project, can be viewed as processes that contribute to dispute avoidance (Table 2), although
this goal is more explicit for some cases than for others. In each case, both industry and government are
actively involved from a number of countries. The work of these committees follows that model of
interest based negotiations as it emphasizes ongoing relationships, provides an opportunity for members Table 2.  Elements of Dispute Resolution
Current
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of industry to become educated about the other’s interests, and to create ongoing ties. The ongoing nature
of their work is important in reducing issues of stereotypes and bias that may have existed at the
beginning. In some cases, the committees had substantial leeway in designing processes used to complete
their mandate. The substantive work accomplished by the committees, namely the development of
regulations that fit the needs of all three countries, contributes to changing the identity of the market
from a national to a trinational market. To the extent that their work facilitates trade—as with the
Restricted Feeder Cattle Project—increased commercial ties will also work to create a trinational market.
Finally, removing regulatory incompatibilities between countries, which tend to result in unequal access
to markets, will also contribute to avoiding conflict over this issue. However, substantive progress may
be slow, as while committees may reach consensus on what types of regulatory changes need to be made,
representatives of each country must work with their own institutions to implement regulatory changes.
The processes discussed in this section address to varying degrees the substantive, procedural, and
psychological issues required to avoid conflict.
Dispute Resolution
The primary processes used for resolving disputes within NAFTA are formal dispute processes,
including national trade remedy law and NAFTA processes, and consultations between governments. As
NAFTA processes are discussed by other authors (Burfisher, Norman, and Schwartz 2000) they will not
be discussed further here. 
U.S. Trade Remedy Law
Countervailing duty and antidumping suits result from petitions brought by U.S. industry groups
for consideration by the U.S. International Trade Commission(USITC) and the U.S. International Trade
Administration (USITA). In this process, evidence is presented to a decision-making panel. Several
similarities can be found between positional bargaining and the application of trade remedy law. The
structure of the process ensures that one party wins and the other loses, without investigation of the
parties’ interests and other solutions that might meet their needs. Due to the assumption that resources
are fixed, and due to the processes used in presenting evidence, parties are forced into an adversarial
relationship.Conflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 11  
The processes used by the USITC and USITA in the application of trade remedy law strive to be
predictable, rule-based, and fair. In order to achieve fairness between industries and over time, strict and
unvarying timetables and economic definitions are used.
However, use of antidumping and countervailing duty suits does not encourage industry groups
to undertake a meaningful investigation of the underlying issues or interests. Industry groups do not need
to, as these investigations, once initiated, are obligated to use prescribed definitions and criteria in
making their determinations. The lack of correspondence between underlying issues and the criteria used
in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations may result in misattributed conflict, namely,
debate over the wrong issue or between the wrong parties (Deutsch 1973). For example, in the R-CALF
case for reducing imports from Canada is the position taken by the U.S. industry, however, one that
would not address the multitude of underlying interests held by the U.S. industry (Young 2000).
Government Consultations—December 1998 “Record of Understanding”
Government consultations are an important mechanism for the resolution of disputes. There are
many examples of government consultation within NAFTA (ERS 1999), the consultations leading to the
December 1998 “Record of Understanding Between the Governments of Canada and the United States of
America Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade” is an example. 
In response to the blockade against U.S. imports of Canadian agricultural goods implemented by
some northern tier state governments in the fall of 1998, the Canadian and U.S. governments began high
level consultations to discuss an array of trade concerns. These consultations resulted in the “Record of
Understanding” that was signed in December 1998 (Record of Understanding 1998). The “Record of
Understanding” contains seventeen action points, addressing a wide range of issues, focused on but not
limited to trade in meat and grains. Many of these issues were regulatory in nature, and no large changes
in agricultural policy were adopted. 
The consultation involved representatives of a wide array of government agencies from both
countries. For the United States, the Office of the Trade Representative and the Department of
Agriculture, and for Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture and Agri-food Canada
took the lead. Other agencies were involved in many of the discussions due to their role in implementing
policy changes, including the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the EnvironmentalConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 12  
Protection Agency for the United States, and from Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
Health Canada, and the Canadian Pesticide Management Regulatory Agency. 
The agenda for the consultations was set and decisions were made by consensus. The United
States has announced formation of an interagency team to monitor implementation of the Record of
Understanding (Palmer 1999). The team includes representatives of the USTR, USDA, the National
Economic Development Council, the State Department, the Commerce Department, and the Customs
Service. High level consultations contrast to the work of the NAFTA committees by their sporadic nature
and the lack of an institutionalized process. These processes, due to their flexibility and the possible
involvement of a wide rang of stakeholders, have the potential to identify interests of the parties and to
explore a wide range of integrative solutions (Table 2). However, in the example given, the consultations
leading to the “Record of Understanding,” the parties who initiated the dispute were not involved in the
solution.
Evaluation of Processes for Dispute Resolution
Informal negotiations and various forms of government consultations are useful in addressing
disputes due to their flexible nature, including flexibility about who is included and the process used.
Rule based procedures are used once conflict reaches formal dispute processes. These procedures are less
likely to address the interests at stake and are more likely to damage the relationship between parties.
The provision of other processes to resolve disputes needs to be investigated. 
Dispute resolution may be facilitated by the USITC and USITA requiring mediation of some
disputes. This would be particularly appropriate when previous investigations did not produce evidence
of uncompetitive conditions or the violation of trade laws. Mediation, through the use of interest-based
negotiation as described earlier, might be a useful avenue for interest groups to find resolution to the
continuing problems in regulatory and policy harmonization. Implementation of these policy changes
would require actions on the part of government that might continue to be slow. However, the intense
interaction between groups required by the process of mediation might assist in shifting the basis of
identity from being based on nations to being based on cooperative interests.
Development of the appropriate procedures for mediation would pose difficult questions. One
question is which groups would be involved in the process. Returning again to the R-CALF dispute, whoConflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 13  
would be involved in the mediation on the U.S. side? Would the appropriate party be the leadership of R-
CALF, the elected leadership of the U.S. Cattlemen’s and Beef Association, or some combination of the
two? Other questions exist around the scope of issues to be considered and implementation of the
settlement options.
Conclusions
Progress in reducing the level of conflict within NAFTA will require working on issues of
dispute avoidance, management and resolution simultaneously, as each plays an important role. As the
author’s research in this field is preliminary, these ideas are offered with the purpose of facilitating
discussion, while recognizing that further refinement and research is required. 
Dispute avoidance can be facilitated by:
• an accurate identification of the interests held by different parties, and a recognition of the
interdependence that exists in many cases;
• promoting industry groups based on their cooperative interests;
• the creation of joint industry and government processes to address substantive issues; and
recognizing that
• stakeholders should be involved in the designing of dispute avoidance processes and in
negotiations on the actual issues.
Ongoing disputes may exist in cases where strong differing national preferences result in
incompatible policy regimes. Dispute management is beyond the scope of the paper, but is an important
area for further work. Some preliminary ideas on the management of such disputes include:
• fragmenting the issue into the smallest possible pieces, and addressing individual problems
(such as a lack of reciprocity) where possible;
• recognizing areas of agreement;
• acknowledging that not one, but several principles may be involved (for example, the
principle of self-determination and the principle of a free market);
• addressing data problems by jointly designing processes for data collection, clarifying areas
of disagreement, and identification of criteria for assessment; and
• agreeing to disagree when necessary, while creating spheres of influence to contain the
problem.
The resolution of disputes may be improved by:
• having a number of processes for dispute resolution; 
• clearly articulating the purpose of each process so that the appropriate process is used in each
case;
• using integrative, interest based approaches first, with the goal of involving stakeholders in
the crafting of a solution; and finally, 
• regular use of mediation or government consultations to attempt to settle a dispute before
moving to judicial processes.Conflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 14  
A focus of further research might be to develop a more comprehensive conceptual framework of
the models of dispute resolution and their advantages and disadvantages for various types of disputes.
This research may be further informed by the development of collaborative public processes used to
resolve disputes in public policy, particularly natural resource questions (Schellenberg 1996; Dukes
1996; Ross 1993). Progress in better management of disputes between NAFTA partners will require the
active involvement and commitment of academics, industry, and government.Conflict Avoidance and Resolution in NAFTA’s Agricultural Trade 15  
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